People’s attitudes towards social norms play a crucial role in understanding group behavior. Norm psychology accounts focus on processes of norm internalization that influence people’s norm following attitudes but pay considerably less attention to social identity and group identification processes. Social identity theory in contrast studies group identity but works with a relatively thin and instrumental notion of social norms. We argue that to best understand both sets of phenomena, it is important to integrate the insights of both approaches. Social (...) status, social identity, and social norms are considered separate phenomena in evolutionary accounts. We discuss assumptions and views that support this separation, and suggest an integrated view of our own. We argue that we should be open to the early origins of human social complexity, and conjecture that the longer that the human social world involved multi-level societies the more probable it is that norm psychology and social identity interacted in rich ways. (shrink)

'Ruin, Repair, and Responsibility' explores and Arendtean conceptualization of the three and their interrelations. At issue is how to understand (a) ruin in its socio-historical specificity but also in terms of what it is that breaks down in the weave of human relations, (b) the possibility or impossibility of repair, and (c) what responsibility may mean when repair is impossible since the very conditions for its possibility have been destroyed.

In Strangers in Our Midst, David Miller develops a philosophical position that is intended to guide the complex decisions that liberal democratic states face regarding immigration policy. While it is not likely that Miller’s arguments will convince anyone who is principally committed to the kind of open borders that truly enable the free movement of people across them, Miller has much to offer to those who are either (a) trying to make sense of the position of people who object to (...) unrestricted migration or (b) are searching for a principled yet more restrictive position that to the extent possible does justice to as many of the people who have stakes in immigration policy, including not only potential immigrants, refugees, as well as economic migrants, but also the people who already live in and are attached to their nations and states. Miller also attempts to do justice to states in their relations with each other. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's Über Gewißheit shows his de facto commitment to the Three Condition Theory, according to which a knowledge-attribution implies belief, justification and truth, i.e., one can't be said to know that p unless (a) he believes that p; (b) he is in a position to justify p; and (c) 'p' is true. However, when it comes to tackling the puzzling infinite regress of justifications Wittgenstein's argument becomes entangled in an epistemological circle. It seems to oscillate between an unwelcome absolutism and (...) a self-refuting relativism as far as epistemological matters are concerned. (shrink)

Bibliography of A. A. Fraenkel (p. ix-x)--Axiomatic set theory. Zur Frage der Unendlichkeitsschemata in der axiomatischen Mengenlehre, von P. Bernays.--On some problems involving inaccessible cardinals, by P. Erdös and A. Tarski.--Comparing the axioms of local and universal choice, by A. Lévy.--Frankel's addition to the axioms of Zermelo, by R. Mantague.--More on the axiom of extensionality, by D. Scott.--The problem of predicativity, by J. R. Shoenfield.--Mathematical logic. Grundgedanken einer typenfreien Logik, von W. Ackermann.--On the use of Hilbert's [epsilon]-operator in scientific theories, (...) by R. Carnap.--Basic verifiability in the combinatory theory of restricted generality, by H. B. Curry.--Uniqueness ordinals in constructive number classes, by H. Putnam.--On the construction of models, by A. Robinson.--Interpretation of mathematical theories in the first order predicate calculus, by T. Skolem.--The elementary character of two notions from general algebra, by R. Vaught.--Foundations of arithmetic and analysis. Axiomatic method and intuitionism, by A. Heyting.--On rank-decreasing functions, by G. Kurepa.--On non-standard models for number theory, by E. Mendelson.--Concerning the problem of axiomatizability of the field of real numbers in the weak second order logic, by A. Mostowski.--Non-standard models and independence of the induction axiom, by M. O. Rabin.--Sur les ensembles raréfiés de nombres naturels, par W. Sierpinski.--Philosophy of logic and mathematics. Remarks on the paradoxes of logic and set theory, by E. W. Beth.--Logique formalisée et raisonnement juridique, par R. Feys.--Im Umkreis der sogenannten Raumprobleme, von H. Freudenthal.--Process and existence in mathematics, by H. Wang. (shrink)

Denić ( 2018, 2019, To appear ) observes that the availability of distributive inferences—for sentences with disjunction embedded in the scope of a universal quantifier—depends on the size of the domain quantified over as it relates to the number of disjuncts. Based on her observations, she argues that probabilistic considerations play a role in the computation of implicatures. In this paper we explore a different possibility. We argue for a modification of Denić’s generalization, and provide an explanation that is based (...) on intricate logical computations but is blind to probabilities. The explanation is based on the observation that when the domain size is no larger than the number of disjuncts, universal and existential alternatives are equivalent if distributive inferences are obtained. We argue that under such conditions a general ban on ‘fatal competition’ (Magri 2009a, b, Spector 2014 ) is activated, thereby predicting distributive inferences to be unavailable. (shrink)

One of the tasks with which communication engineers are presented is that of devising a mechanism by which a significant sequence of words, a message, produced by somebody, the sender of the message, is reproduced at some other place, with the shortest practical time lag. The reproduction must be such that the receiver of the message will be able to understand what the sender meant by his message, at least, if he knows the sender's language. The following illustration is typical: (...) A writes on a sheet of paper “I love you” and wishes that B, 3000 miles away, should become aware of the full content of this message, with little delay and at a low cost. There will be institutions, in a capitalistic society, which will compete with each other in providing A, for a price, with the required service. Those companies which perform these services most satisfactorily, i.e., with an overall better combination of faithfulness, time lag, and cost, will get the job. The executives of these companies will hire engineers and put them to work on improving this overall combination. (shrink)

This article deals with an unstudied criterion for determining lunar crescent visibility, which appears in the Mufrad Z $$\bar{\iota }$$ ι¯ j,. Al-Ṭabar$$\bar{\upiota }$$ ι¯ attributes this circular criterion to Al-B$$\bar{\upiota }$$ ι¯ rūn$$\bar{\upiota }$$ ι¯. Initially, Prof. David King shed light on this criterion in 1987 and explained it briefly. We will examine this criterion by re-computing the underlying numerical values to reconstruct it, in order to demonstrate that it originates from Ḥabash’s simple criterion.

Important aspects of its philosophical basis, and its significance for the foundations of mathematics, appeared in The Foundations of Mathematics (FA, 1884). Six years later, at the beginning of the 1890s, Frege published three articles that mark significant changes in his conception: "Function and Concept" (FC, 1891), "On Sense and Reference" (SR, 1892) and "Concept and Object" (1892). Notable among these changes are: (a) The systematic distinction between the sense and the reference of expressions as two separate ingredients of their (...) meaning. (b) The extension and generalization of the notion of function to include the conception of concepts and relations as functions to truth-values, and the corresponding conception of the two truth-values as objects. These changes were immediately incorporated in the mature, authoritative exposition of his logic in his magnum opus: Basic Laws of Arithmetic (BL), whose first volume appeared in 1893. (shrink)

Let ${\mathbb{B}}$ and ${\mathbb{C}}$ be Boolean algebras and ${e: \mathbb{B}\rightarrow \mathbb{C}}$ an embedding. We examine the hierarchy of ideals on ${\mathbb{C}}$ for which ${ \bar{e}: \mathbb{B}\rightarrow \mathbb{C} / \fancyscript{I}}$ is a regular (i.e. complete) embedding. As an application we deal with the interrelationship between ${\fancyscript{P}(\omega)/{{\rm fin}}}$ in the ground model and in its extension. If M is an extension of V containing a new subset of ω, then in M there is an almost disjoint refinement of the family ([ω]ω) V (...) . Moreover, there is, in M, exactly one ideal ${\fancyscript{I}}$ on ω such that ${(\fancyscript{P}(\omega)/{{\rm fin}})^V}$ is a dense subalgebra of ${(\fancyscript{P}(\omega)/\fancyscript{I})^M}$ if and only if M does not contain an independent (splitting) real. We show that for a generic extension V[G], the canonical embedding $$\fancyscript{P}^V(\omega){/}{\rm fin}\hookrightarrow \fancyscript{P}(\omega){/}(U(Os)(\mathbb{B}))^G$$ is a regular one, where ${U(Os)(\mathbb{B})}$ is the Urysohn closure of the zero-convergence structure on ${\mathbb{B}}$. (shrink)

In this paper, we introduce the notions of -fuzzy filters and -fuzzy Boolean filters in R0-algebras and investigate some of their related properties. Some characterization theorems of these generalized fuzzy filters are derived. In particular, we prove that a fuzzy set in R0-algebras is an -fuzzy Boolean filter if and only if it is an -fuzzy implicative filter. Finally, we consider the concepts of implication-based fuzzy Boolean filters of R0-algebras.

Producing content-related gestures has been found to impact students’ learning, whether such gestures are spontaneously generated by the learner in the course of problem-solving, or participants are instructed to pose based on experimenter instructions during problem-solving and word learning. Few studies, however, have investigated the effect of (a) performing instructed gestures while learning concepts or (b) producing gestures without there being an implied connection between the gestures and the concepts being learned. The two studies reported here investigate the impact of (...) instructed hand movements on students’ subsequent understanding of a concept. Students were asked to watch an instructional video—focused on the concept of statistical model—three times. Two experimental groups were given a secondary task to perform while watching the video, which involved moving their hands to mimic the placement and orientation of red rectangular bars overlaid on the video. Students were told that the focus of the study was multitasking, and that the instructed hand movements were unrelated to the material being learned. In the content-match group the placement of the hands reinforced the concept being explained, and in the content-mismatch group it did not. A control group was not asked to perform a secondary task. In both studies, findings indicate that students in the content-match group performed better on the posttest, and showed less variation in performance, than did students in the content-mismatch group, with control students falling in between. Instructed hand movement—even when presented as an unrelated, secondary task—can affect students’ learning of a complex concept. (shrink)

Most people do not think to observe geology from the sidewalks of a major city, but all David B. Williams has to do is look at building stone in any urban center to find a range of rocks equal to any assembled by plate tectonics. In Stories in Stone, he takes you on explorations to find 3.5-billion-year-old rock that looks like swirled pink-and-black taffy, a gas station made of petrified wood, and a Florida fort that has withstood three hundred years (...) of attacks and hurricanes, despite being made of a stone that has the consistency of a granola bar. Williams also weaves in the cultural history of stone, explaining why a white fossil-rich limestone from Indiana became the only building stone used in all fifty states; how in 1825, the construction of the Bunker Hill Monument led to America’s first commercial railroad; and why when the same kind of marble used by Michelangelo clad a Chicago skyscraper it warped so much after nineteen years that all 44,000 panels of it had to be replaced. This love letter to building stone brings to life the geology you can see in the structures of every city. (shrink)

Dorit Bar-On develops and defends a novel view of avowals and self-knowledge. Drawing on resources from the philosophy of language, the theory of action, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, she offers original and systematic answers to many long-standing questions concerning our ability to know our own minds. We are all very good at telling what states of mind we are in at a given moment. When it comes to our own present states of mind, what we say goes; an (...) avowal such as "I'm feeling so anxious" or "I'm thinking about my next trip to Paris," it is typically supposed, tells it like it is. But why is that? Why should what I say about my present mental states carry so much more weight than what others say about them? Why should avowals be more immune to criticism and correction than other claims we make? And if avowals are not based on any evidence or observation, how could they possibly express our knowledge of our own present mental states? Bar-On proposes a Neo-Expressivist view according to which an avowal is an act through which a person directly expresses, rather than merely reports, the very mental condition that the avowal ascribes. She argues that this expressivist idea, coupled with an adequate characterization of expression and a proper separation of the semantics of avowals from their pragmatics and epistemology, explains the special status we assign to avowals. As against many expressivists and their critics, she maintains that such an expressivist explanation is consistent with a non-deflationary view of self-knowledge and a robust realism about mental states. The view that emerges preserves many insights of the most prominent contributors to the subject, while offering a new perspective on our special relationship to our own minds. (shrink)

The teachings of Madhyamaka have been the basis of Tibetan Buddhist thought and practice since the eighth century. After the twelfth century, Tibetan scholars distinguished two branches of Madhyamaka: Autonomist and Consequentialist. What distinctions in Madhyamaka thought and practice did twelfth century Tibetan scholars make to differentiate these two branches? This article focuses upon a newly identified twelfth century Tibetan manuscript on Madhyamaka from the Collected Works of the Kadampas: Khu lo tsā ba’s Treatise. Khu lo tsā ba, also known (...) as Khu ston Mdo sde ’bar, was a contemporary of Jayānanda and Pa tshab Lo tsā ba Nyi ma grags and instrumental for the revitalized reception of Madhyamaka in twelfth century Tibet. Khu lo tsā ba’s Treatise outlines a multifaceted understanding of Madhyamaka as the work solely focuses upon the distinctions between Autonomist and Consequentialist Mādhyamikas. The paper outlines the structure and content of the Treatise and identifies six topics that the author emphasizes to distinguish Autonomist and Consequentialist branches of Madhyamaka. Based on an overview of these topics, the paper concludes that the Autonomist/Consequentialist distinction of Madhyamaka was already well developed in twelfth century Tibet and involved a differential of systems that encompassed much more than distinct styles of logical proof. (shrink)

Jewish and Christian philosophy existed side by side in the Middle Ages. Both sought the same goal: the explanation of God and His universe. Both utilized the same sources; yet each attained different philosophical and theological systems. The Meditation of the Sad Soul illustrates this divergence between Christian and Jewish thought. Furthermore, since it stands midway between Neo-platonic and Aristotelian Judaism, it underlines the development of key philosophical concepts common to both Judaism and Christianity. Abraham Bar Hayya lived in eleventh (...) century Barcelona, an intellectual center for both Jews and Arabs. The major points of his philosophy blend rabbinical, Neo-platonic and Aristotelian ideas, yet maintain a unique independence of their own. For instance, Abraham cut through the rabbinical and Aristotelian proofs of God, demanding instead a primary positive faith in God's existence. Caught up in the theology of light, he rejected the Platonic idea that darkness was merely an absence of light. Rather, darkness had a force equal to light. Most important, darkness and light were opposites, as were good and evil. God created both. Abraham insists that each had an independent existence in the world. Abraham's thought shows a more "rational" strain which appears later in Christian and even Jewish "heresies." Since good and evil exist as positive forces, man can freely choose his path to salvation. Abraham never gets caught in the Augustinian dilemma of will, grace, and predestination. Further examples of Abraham's independent position crop up in his ideas of creation and time. Creation ex nihilo, of course, but creation in time. Time must have a beginning and, consequently, an end. But man does not have to await passively the Messiah's rectification of sin. Man must repent here on earth and actively lead a good life. He cannot repent after death. How influential was Abraham's tract? The editor calls it a "minor classic" yet does not indicate that it formed a basis for later Christian theology. Maimonides knew it and rejected some of its basic tenets. Still, the book is important since it indicates a striking combination of traditional philosophy subjected to a new critical rationalism, an it foreshadows some of the questions raised by deviant Christian and Jewish theologians.--J. K. B. (shrink)

Expressivism, broadly construed, is the view that the function of utterances in a given area of discourse is to give expression to our sentiments or other (non-cognitive) mental states or attitudes, rather than report or describe some range of facts. This view naturally seems an attractive option wherever it is suspected that there may not be a domain of facts for the given discourse to be describing. Familiarly, to avoid commitment to ethical facts, the ethical expressivist suggests that ethical utterances (...) (e.g., “Gratuitous torture is wrong”, “What John did was morally good”) do not serve to ascribe ethical properties to objects, actions, persons, or states of affairs. Instead, they simply function to give voice to certain of our sentiments (or ‘pro/con’ attitudes). Along similar lines, philosophers have entertained versions of expressivism about the aesthetic, the modal, the mental, what is funny, even about theoretical science and knowledge ascriptions. (shrink)

An information-theoretic approach is shown to derive both the classical weak-field equations and the quantum phenomenon of metric fluctuation within the Planck length. A key result is that the weak-field metric $\bar h_{\mu \nu } $ is proportional to a probability amplitude φuv, on quantum fluctuations in four-position. Also derived is the correct form for the Planck quantum length, and the prediction that the cosmological constant is zero. The overall approach utilizes the concept of the Fisher information I acquired in (...) a measurement of the weak-field metric. An associated physical information K is defined as K=I−J, where J is the information that is intrinsic to the physics (stress-energy tensor Tμv) of the measurement scenario. A posited conservation of information change δI=ΔJ implies a variational principle δK=0. The solution is the weak-field equations in the metric $\bar h_{\mu \nu } $ and associated equations in the probability amplitudes φuv. The gauge condition φ v uv =0 (Lorentz condition) and conservation of energy and momentum Tv μv=0 are used. A well-known “bootstrapping” argument allows the weak-field assumption to be lifted, resulting in the usual Einstein field equations. A special solution of these is well known to be the geodesic equations of motion of a particle. Thus, the information approach derives the classical field equations and equations of motion, as well as the quantum nature of the probability amplitudes φuv. (shrink)

... A. Zvie BAR-ON The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Shmuel Hugo Bergman, one of the most prominent Jewish philosophers of the 20th century, ...

In my reply to Boyle, Rosenthal, and Tumulty, I revisit my view of avowals’ security as a matter of a special immunity to error, their character as intentional expressive acts that employ self-ascriptive vehicles, Moore’s paradox, the idea of expressing as contrasting with reporting and its connection to showing one’s mental state, and the ‘performance equivalence’ between avowals and other expressive acts.

This book contains readings of canonical Western philosophical texts from the viewpoint of current feminist thinking. The contributors focus specifically on the ways in which modern Western philosophy constructs genders and analyzes gender relations. They provide a detailed analysis of modern philosophers’ conceptions of masculinity and femininity and call attention to the intertwining of gender with conceptual schema and networks.

To an ordinary translator, the idea that there are too many perfect translation schemes between any two languages would come as a surprise. Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of translation expresses just this idea. It implies that most of the 'implicit canons' actual translators use in their assessment of translations lack objective status. My dissertation is an attempt to present a systematic challenge to Quine's view of language and to support the idea that one could develop an objective theory of (...) translation which is also faithful to actual translation practices. ;I expose a non-superficial similarity between external-world scepticism and Quine's meaning-scepticism, and deploy against Quine an objection which closely resembles his own objection to external-world scepticism. I then develop a new interpretation of Quine's reasoning, according to which denying objective status to intuitive 'meanings' is Quine's way of avoiding a sceptical problem about what other people 'really' mean. ;I argue that the intelligibility of Quine's meaning-scepticism turns on an implicit contrast between the perspective of the theorist of language and the perspective of the user of language. Quine's defense of his scepticism features a theorist of language trying to probe an alien language-- a 'radical translator' -- who reasons that her own judgments as a language user lack objective status. ;I take issue with the use Quine makes of the above contrast. I first argue that understanding the goal of radical translators requires knowing what is to be expected of an adequate translation scheme. Since this is something we learn from experience with existing translation schemes, I offer a pre-theoretic description of the practice of translation between known languages. I show how ordinary translators' assessments of the quality of given translations derive from systematic judgments they make as language-users. It is these sorts of judgments that guide actual radical translators in ruling out bizarre alternative translations of the kind Quine entertains in defending his scepticism. A proper theoretical account of radical translation, I conclude, must begin with-- and include-- the perspective of the radical translator as a language-user. (shrink)

Also published as Vol. 24 in _Grazer Philosophische Studien_.

Recent discussions of animal communication and the evolution of language have advocated adopting a ‘pragmatics-first’ approach, according to which “a more productive framework” for primate communication research should be “pragmatics, the field of linguistics that examines the role of context in shaping the meaning of linguistic utterances”. After distinguishing two different conceptions of pragmatics that advocates of the pragmatics-first approach have implicitly relied on, I argue that neither conception adequately serves the purposes of pragmatics-first approaches to the origins of human (...) linguistic communication. My main aim in this paper is to motivate–and begin to articulate–an intermediary conception whose scope is narrower than Carnapian pragmatics but broader than Gricean pragmatics. To do so, I first spell out what I take to be the key insight offered by proponents of the Gricean approach concerning the emergence of linguistic communication, namely, its being communication ‘from a psychological point of view’. I then develop this insight using key elements from the anti-Gricean ‘biosemantic’ account of linguistic communication due to Ruth Millikan, Philosophical Perspectives 9, Ridgeview Publishing, Atascedero CA, 1995, Millikan R Varieties of Meaning. Mass.: The MIT Press, Cambridge, Millikan, Beyond concepts: unicepts, language, and natural information, Oxford University Press, Oxford UK, 2017, and elsewhere). I argue that the intermediary pragmatics-first approach that I propose, which draws on both Gricean and Millikanian resources, would be better equipped to serve the purposes of those who search for potential precursors of human linguistic communication in animal communication. (shrink)

As I am sitting at my desk in front of my computer, a thought crosses my mind: There's water in the glass. The thought has a particular content: that there is water in the glass. And, if all is well, there is water in the glass, so my thought is true. According to external-world skepticism, I still do not know that there is water in the glass, because my way of telling what's in front of me does not allow me (...) to rule out the possibility that I’m only under some kind of illusion about what's in front of me. Analogously, according to content skepticism, I cannot know that I am thinking that there is water in my glass, even if in fact that is what I am thinking. This is because for all I know, my way of telling what I am thinking does not allow me to rule out the possibility that I am only under some kind of illusion about what I am thinking. (shrink)

This Great Debates volume grew out of exchanges that followed the 2012 publication of a Festschrift volume for Crispin Wright, just over a decade ago (Coliva 2012). As often happens in Philosophy, the process of trying to clarify and iron out apparently local points of disagreement between us has unearthed deeper divergences concerning larger issues in the philosophy of language and mind, in epistemology, and in the theory of action. Such is our profession.

This book teaches ontology by analyzing and interpreting the major ontological problems which have existed throughout history and which still engage thinkers and scholars today.

So-called basic self-knowledge (ordinary knowledge of one's present states of mind) can be seen as both 'baseless' and privileged. The spontaneous self-beliefs we have when we avow our states of mind do not appear to be formed on any particular epistemic basis (whether intro-or extro-spective). Nonetheless, on some views, these self-beliefs constitute instances of (privileged) knowledge. We are here interested in views on which true mental self-beliefs have internalist epistemic warrant that false ones lack. Such views are committed to a (...) form of disjunctivism about basic self-knowledge. We begin by presenting an influential disjunctivist view about perceptual knowledge (Pritchard 2008, 2012, and elsewhere) and articulate a problem for it. We then consider two versions of disjunctivism about basic self-knowledge – one 'constitutivist', the other 'neo-expressivist' – and argue that both can avoid an analogue of this problem for self-knowledge. However, we give reasons for preferring the disjunctivism yielded by neo-expressivism. We conclude by considering briefly whether an acceptable disjunctivism about mental self-beliefs can point the way toward a sensible disjunctivism about perceptual beliefs. (shrink)